

As ciências sociais vão à guerra

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“The horror! The horror!”<sup>1</sup>

Trato aqui do engajamento, intelectual e institucional, de parte significativa das ciências sociais norte-americanas na guerra do Vietnã, no contexto do Estado de segurança nacional, nos marcos da Guerra Fria. Pretendendo colocar a ciência social a serviço da sociedade americana e reforçar a rede entre a academia e o financiamento governamental, esses cientistas oferecem seu instrumental analítico para a defesa da nação. Um dos argumentos que justifica a conveniência, ou a necessidade, deste engajamento é que estas ciências estão aptas a fornecer um modelo integrado de mudança social, econômica e política que pode guiar a estratégia militar americana, modelo que é formulado pelas teorias da modernização, usadas de modo a ligar a promoção do desenvolvimento social e político com as estratégias das operações de guerra. É o caso do projeto de urbanização forçada do Vietnã, em que a escalada de violência deveria também promover uma transformação fundamental da sociedade vietnamita.

Durante a Segunda Guerra houve forte aproximação entre o Estado e cientistas, não só das chamadas “ciências duras”, mas também das ciências sociais e comportamentais. Não foram poucos os cientistas sociais de renome, pesquisadores e professores universitários de grande influência que mantiveram um relacionamento estreito com o Estado, através das suas agências de segurança e informação. Especialmente sob os governos Kennedy e Johnson muitos destes cientistas, de várias especialidades e de diferentes centros acadêmicos, chegaram a participar intensa e continuamente da formulação de políticas, traduzindo suas idéias em recomendações. Davam continuidade a um trabalho conjunto que já tinha sido importante por ocasião da grande depressão de 1929 e que se fortaleceu bastante durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial.<sup>2</sup>

Christopher Simpson afirma: “By now it is clear that military, intelligence, and propaganda agencies provided the by far the largest part of the funds for large research projects in the social sciences in the United States from World War II until well into the 1960s, and that such funding was designed to support the full range of national security projects of the day, from the benign to the horrific. [...] In some cases, the security agencies’ intervention proved decisive in the ‘scientific’ evolution of an academic field, which is to say, in the establishment of the institutions, texts, methodologies, and body of knowledge regarded as central to that academic enterprise. This has been true particularly in the interdisciplinary fields that have grown up since about 1945, such as development studies, area studies, communication research, and operations research, among others.”<sup>3</sup>

Entre os campos em que este envolvimento de cientistas sociais com o governo norte-americano avançou muito durante a chamada Guerra Fria estão os estudos sobre “desenvolvimento” e os “estudos de área”. Grandes universidades formaram centros específicos onde estes estudos foram institucionalmente alocados e bem financiados com recursos governamentais e de agências filantrópicas. Tais estudos foram utilizados como fundamentação da política norte-americana para a Guerra Fria e também para as guerras propriamente ditas que os Estados Unidos promovem no período. A sociologia oferece uma teoria social geral (a teoria da modernização) que se adapta muito bem às principais questões que o Estado norte-americano enfrentava e assim se torna referência permanente às aplicações de guerra das ciências sociais americanas naquele momento. De acordo com aquela teoria, a modernidade – caracterizada nos termos da sociedade americana contemporânea – é o destino comum e estágio superior de todos os povos, cada um dos quais é pensado como relativamente atrasado e portanto em estágio inferior à sociedade “moderna”.

Halberstam cita um diálogo eloqüente e esclarecedor a respeito, entre o General Curtis LeMay, comandante da Força Aérea, e McGeorge Bundy, assessor especial do Presidente para Assuntos de Segurança Nacional: “We were, LeMay said, swatting at the flies, when we should really be going after the source, the manure piles. Bundy deflected that

one, and LeMay continued: they had targets, oil depots, ports, dikes, and if they existed and we were their enemy and we were enemy enough to fight them and to die, we should tear it all down. ‘We should bomb them into the Stone Age.’ ‘Maybe,’ answered Bundy, ‘they’re already there’.”<sup>4</sup>

Robert McNamara, então secretário de defesa do governo Kennedy, disse que se a Primeira Guerra foi a guerra dos químicos e a Segunda Guerra a guerra dos físicos, então a do Vietnam bem poderia ser considerada a guerra dos cientistas sociais.<sup>5</sup>

Estudos recentes sobre a Guerra do Vietnam nos fazem lembrar que houve uma “outra guerra” no Vietnam. “Enterprising American and South Vietnamese officials – like Edward Landsdale, John Paul Vann, Victor Krulak, George Tanham, Robert Komer, and Nygyen Be – worked hard to raise the status of this ‘other war’ in the eyes of allied policymakers, and they had the backing of social scientists from elite American universities and research institutions, many of whom worked for the U.S. government. Not only did their studies and reports on nation building and counterinsurgency influence the development of U.S. policy with regard to the ‘other war’ in South Vietnam, but they provided the intellectual basis for America’s complex and problematic strategy of managing political change in the Third World”.<sup>6</sup>

É necessário esclarecer em que consiste esta “outra guerra”, já que é aí que a participação dos cientistas sociais se dá preferencialmente. “The ‘other war’ was all that the ‘big unit’ war was not within the context of South Vietnam. It did not include conventional-style combat outside of populated areas conducted by regular American and South Vietnamese military forces against the regular units of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF). But it did include certain U.S.-GVN conventional force activities, such as pacification support (clear and hold) operations, resource control operations, and military-sponsored nation building (civic action) projects. During the Vietnam era, counterinsurgency was employed in two ways. Loosely defined, it simply referred to the allied campaign to quash the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. As used by advocates of a counterinsurgency strategy, though, it normally referred to the

coercive aspect of the 'other war': that is, allied operations undertaken within, or in the vicinity of, populated rural areas designed either to prevent Viet Cong political operatives and armed guerillas from gaining access to the local population or to locate and 'neutralize' the insurgents by killing or arresting them or persuading them to surrender voluntarily. The constructive aspect of the 'other war' was nation building: political, economic, and social activities carried out by civil-military authorities for the purpose of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the South Vietnamese people and constructing the basis for a stable, prosperous, and democratic Republic of Vietnam. For its part, pacification referred to most, but not all, counterinsurgency and nation building activities directed at rural village and hamlet residents; at this level, however, they were more commonly labeled security and development programs."<sup>7</sup>

A pesquisa social patrocinada pelo / para o Estado de segurança nacional nos Estados Unidos tornou-se uma atividade regular e institucionalizada para um número significativo de profissionais das ciências sociais, que através destas atividades alcançaram grande proximidade com o poder político-militar e grande projeção acadêmica.

Nesse momento se manifesta a tendência de ampliar o âmbito da guerra psicológica contra o comunismo desde a persuasão e a propaganda até o desenvolvimento. "At the forefront of this trend were the scholar-warriors of the Center of International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)... . CENIS originated in Project Troy, a top-secret study group based at MIT, whose task was to advise the State Department on how to beam American propaganda across the Iron Curtain. The project's final report, submitted to the secretary of state in February 1951, stressed the importance of cementing tight relations between American universities and the American foreign relations and intelligence bureaucracies. An annex to the report recommended the establishment of grant research centers on university campuses to assist the government in waging political warfare. CENIS was the first center of this kind. It was set up with CIA and Ford Foundation money, and the CIA's assistant director, economist Max Millikan, stepped down to become

the center's first director. Because of the classified nature of its research, CENIS's doors were watched by an armed guard, and badges were necessary to enter the premises."<sup>8</sup>

Num relatório preparado para o Office of Naval Research (ONR), editado por Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lucien Pye e Harry Eckstein "urged the government to award contracts to social scientists for counterinsurgency research. Counterinsurgency, Pye stated in the report, 'may prove to be a more fruitful [research area] for social scientists than many other aspects of military strategy. ... Without question, social science research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces'."<sup>9</sup>

A recomendação foi acatada e gerou grandes financiamentos para projetos de pesquisa e consultoria em ciências sociais. "The recommendation of the ONR report was enacted by the Kennedy administration, and large sums of counterinsurgency research funds were channeled to social scientific research projects and consultancies; Pye and his CENIS colleagues were among the major beneficiaries. Pye taught courses in counterinsurgency theory for the State Department, advised the U.S. Agency for International Development, and, as Christopher Simpson notes, 'was a frequent consultant to government agencies concerning psychological warfare aimed at Asians.' At least one of these consultancies took Pye to Vietnam, where he applied his experience with communist defectors in Malaya to the 'Chieu Hoi' program, a psychological warfare campaign designed to encourage defections of Vietcong personnel. Insights from the theories developed by Pye, Pool, and David Lerner at MIT were also used by the CIA in designing the controversial Phoenix program, which sought to neutralize Vietcong personnel either through persuasion or, in thousand of cases, through summary liquidation."<sup>10</sup>

Um exemplo interessante da forma de participação de um profissional das ciências sociais nas atividades de pesquisas vinculadas ao Estado de segurança nacional norte-americano é Ithiel de Sola Pool. "From about 1966 to 1968 Pool served as a major ARPA contractor for counterinsurgency research in Vietnam. He operated through the Simulmatics Corporation, a private firm Pool cofounded in 1959 to perform computer simulations of voter behavior for the Kennedy presidential campaign. ARPA [Advanced

Research Projects Agency] gave Simulmatics a substantial contract covering several research tasks, including studies of the Chieu Hoi program, rural pacification, and urban insurgency. [...] the Simulmatics contract was a source of research material and / or employment for graduate students.”<sup>11</sup>

No entanto, é importante ressaltar que a partir de um certo momento houve reação de vários cientistas sociais e do movimento estudantil. “The outspoken hawkishness of MIT’s political scientists marked them as favored targets of the antiwar movement on campus. In October 1969, 150 students marched peacefully to the CENIS building, calling for the termination of Pool’s project COMCOM and the other psychological warfare projects: International Communism, headed by Griffith; and the Cambridge Project, which aimed to develop computer techniques for social scientific foreign area research. Several weeks later Pool, Pye, Griffith, and Max Millikan were tried by a mock revolutionary tribunal and found guilty of ‘crimes against humanity’.”<sup>12</sup>

Quanto ao conhecimento sociológico aplicado diretamente à guerra, Samuel P. Huntington, por exemplo, em “The Bases of Accommodation”<sup>13</sup> analisa a situação socio-política vietnamita e entende que o controle exercido pelo governo central alcança somente a população urbana, de tal modo que a característica crucial das áreas rurais mais conflagradas é a ausência de organização social e política eficaz acima do nível local, se é que existe neste nível. Huntington supõe que os viet-congs operariam sobre este vazio de poder: “The strength of the Viet Cong is its ability to fill this vacuum of authority.” A partir desta suposição, conclui que “The depopulation of the countryside struck directly at the strength and potential appeal of the Viet Cong.”<sup>14</sup>

Tendo estas suposições como fundo, Huntington remete a uma formulação de Sir Robert Thompson que aponta como característica mais marcante da revolução popular maoísta e norte-vietnamita “its immunity to the direct application of mechanical and conventional power”.<sup>15</sup> Apoiando-se nesta formulação, Huntington propõe uma recomendação de ordem estratégica militar. Diz: “In the light of recent events, this statement needs to be seriously qualified. For if the ‘direct application of mechanical and conventional

power' takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate."<sup>16</sup> Aponta assim uma maneira para acabar com a "imunidade à aplicação direta de força mecânica e convencional" a que Thompson se referia. Huntington acrescenta: "em escala maciça" tal que produza "uma migração maciça do campo para a cidade". Em sua análise prévia, Huntington utiliza dados censitários sobre urbanização no Vietnã. Em sua sugestão de estratégia militar, fala em migração maciça do campo para a cidade promovida por aplicação maciça de "força mecânica e convencional", recorrendo a uma expressão que camufla, mas não esconde tratar-se de bombardeio maciço sobre a população camponesa. Esta eliminação da população rural através de bombardeio maciço, somada ao deslocamento da população rural remanescente, aterrorizada com novos bombardeios maciços, Huntington chama de "revolução urbana patrocinada pela América". Assim, conclui: "The Maoist-inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American-sponsored urban revolution."<sup>17</sup>

Diante deste tipo de "expertise" sociológica aplicada à guerra, Eqbal Ahmad comenta: "Sam simply lost the ability to distinguish between urbanization and genocide."<sup>18</sup>

#### Notas

<sup>1</sup> Conrad, Joseph. *The Heart of Darkness*. Edição bilíngüe. Paris: Gallimard, 1996, p.300.

<sup>2</sup> Ver Ribeiro, Flávio Diniz. *Poder e Conhecimento: A Construção das Ciências Sociais na Guerra Fria*, XII Congresso Brasileiro de Sociologia, Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia, Belo Horizonte, 31 de maio a 3 de junho de 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Simpson, Christopher. Universities, Empire, and the Production of Knowledge: An Introduction, in Simpson, Christopher (editor). *Universities and Empire. Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War*. New York: The New Press, 1998, p. XII.

<sup>4</sup> Halberstam, David. *The Best and the Brightest*. Twentieth-Anniversary Edition, with a New Introduction by the Author. New York: Ballantine Books, 1992, p. 462.

<sup>5</sup> McDougall, Walter A., Back to Bedrock. The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft, *Foreign Affairs*, 76, no. 2, March/April 1997, p. 141.

<sup>6</sup> Marquis, Jefferson P., The Other Warriors: American Social Science and Nation Building in Vietnam, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2000, p. 79-80.

<sup>7</sup> Id., *ibid.*, p. 80, nota 4.

<sup>8</sup> Oren, Ido. *Our Enemies & US. America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 148.

<sup>9</sup> Id, *ibid.*, p. 149.

<sup>10</sup> Id.

<sup>11</sup> Id, *ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>12</sup> Id, *ibid.*, p. 152. "Pool sought to estimate the size of Soviet audiences by developing a computer simulation model of communication in totalitarian societies (this effort became designated Project COMCOM)". Id., *ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>13</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., The bases of accommodation, *Foreign Affairs*, 64, July 1968, p. 642-656.

<sup>14</sup> Id., *ibid.*, p. 644.

<sup>15</sup> Thompson, Sir Robert, Squaring the Error, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968, p. 447, apud Huntington, Samuel P. Op. cit., p.650.

<sup>16</sup> Id., *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Id., *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Ahmad, Eqbal, Revolution Warfare and Counterinsurgency, in Miller, Norman & Aya, Roderick (editors). *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World*. New York: Free Press, 1971, p. 198, apud Gilman, Nils. *Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 233 e nota 57, p. 306.